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Internet: charles.radley@lerc.nasa.gov 
Fax: (216) 977-1495. 
November 1995 is the scheduled publication date for the NASA Guidebook for Analysis 
and Development of Safety Critical Software. Development of the guidebook has 
substantially focused the thinking of the NASA Software Assurance community with 
respect to high risklhigh value software applications. The guidebook has been developed 
as a practical "how to" guide, to assist in the implementation of the recent NASA 
Software Safety Standard NSS-1740.13 which was released as "Interim" version in June 
1994, scheduled for formal adoption late 1995. 
The Guidebook is in four main parts: 
Section 2) System safety context 
Section 3) Software Safety planning 
Section 4) Development of Safety Critical Software 
Section 5) Analysis of Safety critical software. 
In addition there is an extensive glossary, appendices and list of references. 
Each section is subdivided into a section for each of the following software lifecycle 
phases: concept, requirements, architectural design, detailed design, and implementation. 
Two complementary philosophies were adopted, a) elimination/reduction of faults/errors, 
and b) fault tolerant techniques. 
Both techniques are essential, because it is impossible to eliminate all faults and errors, so 
some degree of fault tolerance will always be required. However, fault tolerance and 
redundancy is expensive to implement, so elimination and reduction of faults should be 
attempted to avoid unnecessary redundancy. 
The earlier a fault is corrected in the lifecycle, the lower the cost. Faults identified late are 
expensive to correct. So emphasis is given to correctness of requirements prior to their 
implementation in design The most rigorous method of developing requirements is 
"Formal Methods" which are discussed in some depth in an Appendix. However, Formal 
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Methods are expensive to implement, so discussion is provided of less costly but less 
rigorous techniques, and when it is appropriate to use them. Formal Methods requires a 
substantial investment in training, and procurement of logical tools. It translates traditional 
human language (e.g., English) specifications into "High Order Logic" (HOL) lemmas 
The HOL representation reveals defects such as ambiguity, contradictions, double 
meanings, circular definitions and missing requirements. 
Fault tolerance requires hardware redundancy, either parallel paths for "Must-work 
Functions" (MWFs) or series inhibits for "Must-Not-Work Functions" (MNWFs). To 
avoid common cause faults, the redundant paths or inhibits must be independent, using 
dissimilar redundancy. For software to be independent, N-version programming should be 
used, but this is expensive Different types of N-version programming protect against 
different types of faults 
Analysis techniques include Hazards Analysis, Fault Trees, Petri Nets, Dynamic 
Flowgraphs, and Resources Guidance is provided on software design techniques and 
practices. 
Software safety costs money, and its value is poorly understood by financial managers. 
The Guidebook provides guidelines for assessing how much of a program's resources 
should be devoted to Software Safety as a function of the risk of system failure. These 
guidelines are intended to assist decision makers to make an informed risk versus cost 
assessment. Subsequently it will assist software developers and safety analysts to achieve 
and verify the most appropriate degree of software safety. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is impossible to provide a complete synopsis of the 200 page guidebook in a single 
conference paper Instead, we have selected a few key technical elements which are the 
most significant recommendations for software developers and safety analysts 
1.1 Scope 
The NASA Guidebook for Safety Critical Software - Analysis and Development, was 
prepared by the NASA Lewis Research Center, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, 
under a Research Topic (RTOP) task for the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. The NASA Software Safety Standard NSS 1740 1 prepared by NASA 
HQ addresses the "who, what, when and why" of Software Safety Analyses. This 
Software Safety Analysis Guidebook addresses the "how to" The focus of this document 
is on analysis and development of safety critical software The guidebook can also be 
used for analysis and development of firmware which is software residing in non-volatile 
memory, e g., ROM or EPROM 
There are many different techniques described in the literature. Here they are brought 
together, evaluated, and compared The guidebook addresses the value added versus cost 
of each technique with respect to the overall software safety goals. 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of the guidebook is to provide an aid to the various organizations involved in 
the development and assurance of safety critical software. 
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1.3 Acknowledgments 
The material presented in the guidebook has been based on a variety of sources These 
sources are too numerous to list here. 
A special acknowledgment is owed to the NASAlCaltech Jet Propulsion Laboratory of 
Pasadena, California, whose draft "Software Systems Safety Handbook" has been used 
verbatim or slightly modified in several sections of the guidebook. 
We also thank the American Society of Safety Engineers for permission to reproduce 
portions of the paper. Gowen, Lon D. and Collofello, James S "Design Phase 
Considerations for Safety-Critical Software Systems". PROFESSIONAL SAFETY, April 
1995. 
2. System Safety Program 
A system safety program is a prerequisite to performing analysis or development of safety 
critical software 
It is often claimed that "software cannot cause hazards", however this is only true where 
the software resides on a non-hazardous platform and does not interface with any 
hazardous hardware 
2 1 Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA) 
The PHA is the first of a series of system level hazards analyses, whose scope and 
methodology is described in the NASA NHB 1700 series documents, and NSTS 13830 
Implementation Procedure for NASA Payload System Safety Requirements. 
3 Software Safety Planning 
This section discusses the level of effort for both software development support tasks, and 
software analysis tasks to be performed by software development personnel, and software 
safety personnel respectively. On the development side, the software safety engineer flows 
safety requirements to the software developers and monitors their implementation On the 
analysis side, the software safety engineer analyses software products and artifacts to 
identify new hazards and new hazard causes to be controlled. The analysis and 
development tasks follow the software development 
lifecycle. 
The level of effort required is related to the system risk index, based on severity and 
probability of occurrence of hazards. 
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Table 3-4 Software Requirements Phase through Table 3-10 Software Module Testing 
are modifications of tables that appear in the International Electrotechnical Committee 
(lEC) draft standard IEC 1508, "Software For Computers In The Application Of 
Industrial Safety-Related Systems". Their set of tables is the best known (but unpublished) 
planning guide in existence for software safety. 
LifeCycle 
Phase 
Concept 
Initiation 
Software 
Requirements 
Tasks and 
Priorities 
Table 3-4 Software Requirements Phase 
Table 3-4 Software Requirements Phase 
How to: How to· 
Development Analysis 
Tasks Tasks 
Section 4 1 Section 5.1 
Section 4 2 Section 5 1 
Software Table 3-5 Software Architectural Design Section 43 Section 5.2 
Architectural Design 
Software Table 3-6 Software Detailed Design Phase Section 4 4 Section 5 3 
Detailed Design 
Software Table 3-7 Software Implementation Phase Section 4 5 Section 5 4 
Implementation 
Software 
Test 
Table 3-8 Software Testing Phase 
Table 3-9 Dynamic Testing 
Table 3-10 Software Module Testing 
4 Safety Critical Software Development 
Section 4.6 Section 55 
Software safety activities which should be incorporated into the software development 
phases of a project. 
4.1 Software Concept and Initiation Phase 
For most NASA projects this lifecycle phase involves system level requirements and 
design development. 
4.2 Software Requirements Phase 
The cost of correcting software faults and errors escalates dramatically as the development 
life cycle progresses. Thus it is important to correct errors and implement correct software 
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requirements from the very beginning However it is generally impossible to eliminate all 
errors Hence two goals or philosophies are continuously required· 
1) Development of complete and correct requirements and correct code 
2) Development of fault-tolerant designs, which will detect and compensate for 
software faults "on the fly". 
Both these thought processes must begin during initial requirements development. 
4.2.1 Development of Software Safety Requirements 
Software safety requirements are obtained from several sources, and are of two types, 
generic and specific The generic category of software safety requirements are derived 
from sets of requirements which are commonly used in different programs and 
environments to solve common software safety problems Specific software safety 
requirements are system unique functional capabilities or constraints which are identified 
in three ways: 
1) Through top down analysis of system design requirements 
2) From the PHA 
3) Through bottom up analysis of design data 
4 2 2 Generic Software Safety Requirements 
Sources of generic software safety requirements 
NSTS 19943 Command Requirements and Guidelines for NSTS Customers 
STANAG 4404 (Draft) NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) Safety Design 
Requirements and Guidelines for Munition Related Safety Critical Computing Systems 
EWRR (Eastern and Western Range Regulation) 127-1, Section 3.164 Safety Critical 
Computing System Software Design Requirements. 
AFISC SSH 1-1 System Safety Handbook - Software System Safety, Headquarters Air 
Force Inspection and Safety Center. 
EIA Bulletin SEB6-A System Safety Engineering in Software Development (Electrical 
Industries Association) 
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Software Safety standard 
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Underwriters Laboratory - UL 1998 Standard for Safety - Safety-Related Software, 
January 4th, 1994 
4.2 2.1 Fault Tolerance/Independence 
Most NASA space systems employ failure tolerance to achieve an acceptable degree of 
safety. This is primarily achieved via hardware, but software is also important, because 
improper software design can defeat the hardware failure tolerance. 
"Must-Work Functions" (MWFs) achieve failure tolerance through independent parallel 
redundancy. For parallel redundancy to be truly independent there must be dissimilar 
software in each parallel path Software can be considered "dissimilar" if N-Version 
programming is used. N-version programming is discussed below in Section 43.1.1 N-
Version Programming. 
"Must-Not-Work Functions" (MNWFs) achieve failure tolerance through independent 
multiple series inhibits For series inhibits to be considered independent they must be 
generally controlled by different processors containing dissimilar software. 
4 2 2 2 Hazardous Commands 
4 2 2 3 Coding Standards 
One class of generic software requirements are coding standards, these are in practice 
"safe" subsets of programming languages. These are needed because most compilers can 
be unpredictable in how they work For example, dynamic memory allocation, the defaults 
chosen by the compiler might be unsafe See 4 5 Software Implementation. 
4.22.4 Timing, Sizing and Throughput Considerations 
System design should properly consider real-world parameters and constraints, including 
human operator response times, and control system response times, and flow these down 
to software appropriately. Adequate margins of capacity should be provided for all these 
critical resources. 
Automatic sating is often required if the time to criticality is shorter than the realistic 
human operator response time, or if there is no human in the loop 
Control system design should be based on the established body of control theory, such as 
dynamic control system design, and multivariable design in the s-domain for analog 
continuous processes Sampled analog processes should make use of Z-transforms to 
develop difference equations to implement the control laws This will also make most 
efficient use of real-time computing resources 
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Quantization: Digitized systems should select wordlengths long enough to reduce the 
effects of quantization noise to ensure stability of the system. 
42.3 Formal Methods - Specification Development 
Formal Methods is a process which translates all requirements into a quasi-mathematical 
language of logical expressions. This forces a singular interpretation of all the 
requirements, and makes it easier to find missing, incomplete or conflictinglinconsistent 
requirements. This ensures that the specification analysis is thorough, accurate, and 
consistent Ad hoc specification analysis is unlikely to screen all the requirements errors, 
except for relatively simple systems However, Formal Methods are expensive to 
implement and require a substantial investment in training in order to be effective, so they 
are not appropriate for low risk systems or where the developers and analysts have no 
prior experience. The first step in the process of Formal Methods is to develop 
Requirements State Machines or State Transition Diagrams. 
A broad range of subtasks comprises Formal Methods. Those subtasks performed during 
software requirements development phase include the following: 
Finite state machine/State Transition charts 
Transaction Analysis 
Proofs of Correctness 
An introduction to Formal Methods is provided as Appendix-2 of the guidebook Detailed 
descriptions of Formal methods and state machines are given in the NASA Formal 
Methods Guidebook. " 
4 3 Architectural Design Phase 
The main safety objective of architectural design phase is to define the strategy for 
achieving the required level of fault tolerance in the different parts of the system. The 
degree of fault tolerance required can be inversely related to the degree of fault reduction 
used, e.g, Formal Methods. However, even the most rigorous level of fault reduction will 
not prevent all faults, and some degree of fault tolerance is generally required. 
Independence / Failure Tolerance 
NASA currently uses mostly hardware failure tolerance to control hazards The degree of 
hardware or system failure tolerance required varies with the severity of the hazard as 
follows. 
Catastrophic Hazards. two- failure tolerance required 
Critical Hazards single failure tolerance required. 
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These criteria are based on extensive experience of spacecraft flight operations which led 
to an accepted understanding of failure probabilities, and these levels of failure tolerance 
are accepted as necessary and sufficient to achieve an acceptable (low) level of risk 
However, because of the unpredictable number of latent errors which might exists in 
software, software failure tolerance cannot be relied upon or verified in the same way 
Different hazard control approaches must be used for software versus hardware 
To prevent fault propagation from uncontrolled software, SSCSCs must be fully 
independent of non-safety critical components 
One approach is to establish "Fault Containment Regions" (FCRs) to prevent propagation 
of software faults. This attempts to prevent fault propagation such as· from non-critical 
software to SCCSCs; from one redundant software unit to another, or from one SCCSC 
to another Techniques known as "firewalling" should be used to provide sufficient 
isolation ofFCRs to prevent hazardous fault propagation. 
Methods of achieving independence are discussed in more detail in Reference [1] "The 
Computer Control of Hazardous Payloads", NASNJSCIFDSD, 24 July 1991. FCRs are 
defined in reference [2]2 SSP 50038 Computer Based Control System Safety 
Requirements - International Space Station Alpha 
[11] Gowen, Lon D. and Collofello, James S. "Design Phase Considerations for Safety-
Critical Software Systems". PROFESSIONAL SAFETY, April 1995. 
Gowen and Colldfield Reference [11] recommend four techniques for achieving fault-
tolerance. Their paper is summarized below with permission, because it contains an 
excellent survey of the state of the art in these key areas. 
Their five recommended techniques are· 
N-Version programming 
Recovery blocks 
Resourcefulness 
Abbott-Neuman Components. 
Self-Checks 
In addition, a summary of fault-tolerant solutions is given in Table 5.3.1 taken from 
reference [11]. 
4.3.1 1 N-Version Programming 
This technique uses mUltiple software versions to tolerate runtime faults 
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N-Version programming is time consuming and expensive, as is maintaining multiple 
versions In addition, the different versions are not necessarily independent in their failures 
because different programmers tend to make similar errors, especially when errors are due 
to a flaw in the requirement's definition (Knight and Leveson [13], Brilliant, Knight and 
Leveson [14,15]) Under such conditions, the majority vote may be wrong, thus causing a 
hazard. 
Despite its negative aspects, N-Version programming is useful for fault tolerance. 
4.3.1.2 Recovery blocks 
Like N-version programming, this technique uses multiple software versions to find and 
recover from faults In contrast, recovery blocks use an (internal) acceptance test on each 
version's output until output passes a test. The (internal) acceptance test uses reverse 
engineering to determine whether output is acceptable. 
4.3 1.3 Resourcefulness 
Resourcefulness concentrates on achieving system goals and requires systems that are 
functionally rich [21] Such a system can obtain its goals through multiple means For 
example, an airplane can descend by using its flaps to increase drag or decreasing its speed 
to reduce lift Resourcefulness is a system's ability to achieve goals via various known 
means so that the system can handle failures by trying different sub-goals 
43.14 Abbott-Neuman Components 
This technique combines various ideas: Abbott's software-component concept, Neumann's 
design criteria and software self-checks (Abbott [21], Neumann [22], Anderson [20], and 
Lee [TBD]) Abbott suggested that software focus can be the component level (i.e, 
module, package, task, etc.). which is where complexity originates. To increase a 
component's fault tolerance, Abbott applied Neumann's design criteria, which states that 
each component must be self-protecting and self checking A self protecting component 
does not allow other components to crash it, rather it returns an error indication to the 
calling component A self-checking component detects its own errors and attempts to 
recover from them. 
4 3 1 5 Self Checks 
Self-checks are not a fault-tolerant technique, but a classification of dynamic fault-
detection categories, which various fault-tolerant techniques use. For example, N-version 
programming uses a replicative self-check, while recovery blocks use replication and either 
a reversal or reasonableness self-check. 
Structural self-check is one that requires more explanation, it uses redundant data and 
checks to ensure that components manipulate complex data structures correctly. 
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(This concludes the summary of [11] Gowen, Lon D. and Collofello, James S "Design 
Phase Considerations for Safety-Critical Software Systems". PROFESSIONAL SAFETY, 
Apri11995.) 
4.4 Detailed Design Phase 
The following tasks during the detailed design phases should support software safety 
activities. 
1. Program Set Architecture. 
2. Internal Program Set Interfaces. 
3. Shared Data. 
4. Functional Allocation 
5. Error Detection and Recovery. 
6. Inherited or Reused Software and COTS. 
7. Design Feasibility, Performance, and Margins. 
8. Integration 
9. Interface Design. 
10. Formal Methods - Formal specification Development (see 423) 
4.5 Software Implementation 
It is during software coding that software controls of safety hazards are actually 
implemented. Programmers must recognize not only the explicit safety-related design 
elements but should also be cognizant of the types of errors which can be introduced into 
non-safety-critical code which can compromise safety controls 
4.6 Software Integration and Test 
The safety testing effort should be limited to those software requirements classed as 
safety-critical items. Safety testing can be performed as an independent series of tests or as 
an integral part of the developer's test effort. 
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4.6 1 Testing Techniques 
Testing should be performed in a controlled environment in which execution is controlled 
and monitored or in a demonstration environment where the software is exercised without 
interference. 
4 7 Software Acceptance and Delivery Phase 
Once the software has completed its acceptance testing it can be released either as a stand-
alone item, or as part of a larger system acceptance. 
Accompanying release of the software should be an Acceptance Data Package (ADP) 
This package as a minimum should contain a user manual. 
5. Software Safety Analysis 
During the software Iifecycle, the software safety organization performs various analysis 
tasks, employing a variety of techniques. This section describes techniques which have 
been useful in NASA activities and some from elsewhere Some discussion on the cost and 
value of each technique is provided. 
As software controls become more defined software hazard analyses will identify 
individual program sets, modules, units, etc which are safety-critical 
5 1 Analysis of the Software Requirements for Potential Hazards 
The requirements analysis activity clarifies and codifies safety requirements for the 
software and makes them consistent and complete 
5 1.1 Software Safety Requirements Flowdown Analysis 
5.1 2 Requirements Criticality Analysis 
5.1 3 Formal Specification Analysis 
Specification analysis evaluates the completeness, correctness, consistency, and testability 
of software requirements. Techniques used to perform specification analysis are: 
hierarchy analysis, 
control-flow analysis, 
information-flow analysis, and 
functional simulation 
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For the latter three techniques a large, well established body of literature exists describing 
in detail these methods, and many others, and background for each Instead of 
reproducing those lengthy texts the reader is directed to these excellent references' 
Beizer, Boris, "Software Testing Techniques", Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1990. - (Note: 
Despite its title, the book mostly addresses analysis techniques). 
Beizer, Boris, "Software System Testing and Quality Assurance", Van Nostrand Reinhold, 
1987. (Also includes many analysis techniques). 
Yourdon Inc., "Yourdon Systems Method - model driven systems development", Yourdon 
Press, N J., 1993. 
DeMarco, Tom, "Software State of the Art. selected papers', Dorset House, NY, 1990. 
5.1 4 Formal Inspections of Specifications 
Formal inspections and formal analysis are different. Formal inspections are otherwise 
known as Fagan Inspections, named after John Fagan of mM who devised the method 
NASA has published a standard and guidebook for implementing the Formal Inspection 
(PI) Process, Software Formal Inspections Standard (NASA-Sm-2202-93) and 
Software Formal Inspections Guidebook (NASA-GB-A302) . FIs can and should be 
performed within every major step in the software development process However, they 
have the most value during the earlier requirements development phases, and decreasingly 
less value in later design and coding phases. 
5.2 ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN ANALYSIS 
The software architectural design process develops the high level design that will 
implement the software requirements 
After allocation of the software safety requirements to the software design, Safety Critical 
Computer Software Components (SCCSCs) are identified 
Analyses described for Architectural Design Phase are as follows 
Update Criticality Analysis 
Conduct Hazard Risk Assessment 
Analyze Architectural Design 
Interdependence Analysis 
Independence Analysis 
5.3 Detailed Design Analysis 
During Detailed Design phase more detailed software artifacts are available, permitting 
rigorous analyses to be performed. Detailed Design Analyses can make use of artifacts 
such as the following' detailed design specifications, Pseudo-Code, emulators and 
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Program Description Language products (PDL). Preliminary code produced by code 
generators within case tools should be evaluated. 
Many analysis techniques to be used on the final code can be "dry run" on these design 
products. In fact, it is recommended that all analyses planned on the final code should 
undergo their first iteration on the code-like products of the detailed design. This will 
catch many errors before they reach the final code where they are more expensive to 
correct. The following techniques can be used during this design phase. 
Design Logic analysis 
Software Fault Tree Analysis 
Petri Nets 
Dynamic Flowgraph Analysis 
Markov Modeling 
Design Data Analysis 
Design Interface analysis 
Measurement of Complexity 
Design Constraint Analysis 
Safe Subsets of Programming Languages 
Formal Methods 
Requirements State Machines 
Formal Inspections 
5.4 CODE ANALYSIS 
Code analysis verifies that the coded program correctly implements the verified design and 
does not violate safety requirements In addition at this phase of the development effort, 
many unknown questions can be answered for the first time. For example, the number of 
lines of code, memory resources and CPU loads can be seen and measured, where 
previously they were only predicted, often with a low confidence level Sometimes 
significant redesign is required based on the parameters of the actual code 
Code permits real measurements of size, complexity and resource usage. 
Some of the techniques used in the performance of code analysis mirror those used in 
design analysis However, the results of the analysis techniques might be significantly 
different than during earlier development phases, because the final code may differ 
substantially from what was expected or predicted. 
1 DESIGN LOGIC ANALYSIS 
2 Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFT A) 
3 Petri-Nets 
4 Design Data Analysis 
5 Design Interface Analysis 
6 Measurement of Complexity 
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7 Design Constraint Analysis 
8 Safe Subsets of Programming languages 
9 Fonnal Methods and Safety-Critical Considerations 
10 Requirements State Machines 
Each of the analyses in this section should be undergoing their second iteration, since they 
should have all been applied previously to the code-like products (PDL) of the detailed 
design. 
5.5 TEST ANALYSIS 
Two sets of analyses should be perfonned during the testing phase. 
1) analyses before the fact to assure validity of tests and, 2) analyses of the test results 
5.6 SOFTWARE OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE 
Maintenance of software differs completely from hardware maintenance Unlike hardware, 
software does not degrade or wear out over time, so the reasons for software maintenance 
are different. 
The main purposes for software maintenance are as follows: 
to correct known defects 
to correct defects discovered during operation 
to add or remove features and capabilities (as requested by customer, user or 
operator) 
to compensate or adapt for hardware changes, wear out or failures 
The most common safety problem during this phase is lack of configuration control, 
resulting in undocumented and poorly understood code. "Patching" is a common improper 
method used to "fix" software "on the fly". Software with multiple undocumented patches 
has resulted in major problems where it has become completely impossible to understand 
how the software really functions, and how it responds to its inputs. 
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